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ARGUMENT
THE STATE'S RESPONSIVE BRIEF FAILS TO-PERCEIVE THE
ISSUE IN THIS CASE THAT IN ABSENCE OF A LEGISLATIVE
MAXIMUM, PROBATION PERIODS FOR MISDEMEANORS IN UTAH
ARE LIMITED BY THE PERIOD OF PUNISHMENT FOR THE
OFFENSE IN QUESTION:
Appellant believes that the majority of the arguments presented
by respondent in its brief are answered by the original brief of
appellant in this case.

However, it is clear that respondent has

missed the thrust of the argioment presented by appellant:

that because

the Utah legislature has not established a maximum limit for probation
in misdemeanor cases, the maximum must be the period of incarceration
for the offense in question.

In support of this position, appellant cite

in its original brief numerous cases which held that where no legislative
maximum for probation occurred, the probationary period was limited
by the period of incarceration established by the State legislature.
See Appellant!s Brief pp. 3-14.
Respondent admits that these cases may have had that holding

but asserts they were overruled by subsequent legislative action.

For

example, respondent argues that "Kansas law now allows probation
for up to four times the maximum incarceration period. . ." and that
In re Carroll, 91 KAN. 395, 137 P. 975 (1914) ". . .has long since been
overturned by legislative action."

Respondent's Brief pp. 10-11.

Appellant argues that respondent's phraseology is grossly misleading.
In the Carrol case, the Kansas Supreme Court struggled with the issue
in absence of a legislatively prescribed maximum or limit for probation.
When, in 1947, the Kansas legislature provided such a law, the case
rule became moot, but it was not "overturned.!f

The Kansas Supreme

Court recognized a void in the law in 1914 and filled it with its
opinion in Carrol.
Court's opinion.

Subsequent legislation was in harmony with the

Rather than being overturned or reversed, Carrol

stands for the proposition that the concept of Due Process of Law
requires a maximum limit for probation just as it requires a maximum
limit for imprisonment; and that where the legislature has failed to
establish such a maximum limit, that limit will be determined by the
legislative limit on incarceration for the offense in question.
Respondent uses this same reasoning in misinterpreting
appellant's use of the Oklahoma case of Ex Parte Eaton, 29 OKLA. CRIM.
275, 233 p. 781 (1925).

Respondent argues that because the Oklahoma

legislature acted and set a two year limit on misdemeanor probation
that Eaton does not apply to our situation.

Respondent's Brief p. 12.

Eaton like Carrol stands for the proposition that the judiciary must
move to fill the vacuum where a state legislature has not established
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limits on probation; and further, that the judiciary should adopt the
statutory punishment limit as the probation limit.

The subsequent

enactment by the Oklahoma legislature does not affect this case as
being authority for appellant's proposition.
Respondent observes that the Idaho cases cited by appellant
involve felonies and then smugly dismisses them as "obviously not
authority for appellant's position'1 (sic) Respondent's Brief p. 12.
Idaho's statute is virtually identical to Utah's (Appellant's Brief
p. 5) and the Idaho Supreme Court observed in two different cases that
where no statutory maximum for probation is prescribed, the maximum
is determined by the penalty for the offense.

Respondent does not

explain and appellant does not understand how the fact that felonies
were involved can alter that principle developed by our sister state,
and appellant urges this Court to reject that sort of unsupported
assertion.
Respondent asks this Court to reject the case of People v.
Blakeman, 170 Ca. 2d 596, 339 P.2d 202 (1959) because it involved a
case where the trial judge failed to set a limit, not where a statutory
limit was lacking.

Although correct, respondent fails to grasp the

principle reiterated by the California Court that "when the probationary
period is not specified it is deemed to be for the maximum possible
period of imprisonment."

339 P.2d at 204.

And see Appellant's Brief

p. 8.
Respondent cites the United States Supreme Court case of
Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 23 L. Ed. 2d 162, 89 S. Ct.
1503 (1969) for the proposition that probation periods can be longer
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than maximum periods for incarceration.
the thrust of appellant's argument.

Again respondent misses

Mr. Justice Marshall, in the

segment of his opinion quoted by respondent at page 6 of its brief,
points out that a federal

statute specifically provides for a longer

period of probation than the period of imprisonment.
§3653.

See 18 U.S.C.

The Frank case therefore, does not address itself to the

issue involved in the instant appeal because no legislative vacuum,
such as exists in Utah, exists in the federal system.
Finally, respondent cites the American Bar Association's
Standards for Criminal Justice as authority for the proposition that
probation terms may be longer than jail terms.

Respondent states

"The American Bar Association suggests two years probation for a
misdemeanor and up to five for a felony".

Respondents brief page 7.

Respondent has misconstrued and overlooked the American Bar Association
true position on the question.

The sub-section referred to by

respondent reads in its entirety as follows:
11

(d) The court should specify at the time of sentencing
the length of any term during which the defendant is to
be supervised and during which the court will retain power
to revoke the sentence for the violation of specified
conditions. Neither supervision nor the power to
revoke should be permitted to extend beyond a legislatively
fixed time, which should in no event exceed two years
for a misdemeanor or five years for a felony."
A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating
to Probation, Approved Draft 1970, §1.1
It should be clear that rather than recommending two years
probation for a misdemeanor and five years for a felony, the Standards
urge an absolute maximum of those terms.

Most important for purposes

of this appeal however, is the fact that the Standards urge that
probation not be allowed to extend beyond a legislatively fixed
-4-

maximum.

It is clear that the American Bar Association Standards

fully support appellant's position that all states should have such
a legislative maximum.
state legislatures.

What that maximum is should be up to the

However, where the legislature has not

established such a maximum period for probation, appellant urges
this court to accept the uncontradicted weight of authority and fill
the void by limiting probation to the maximum period for
incarceration.
It may very well be that if the Utah legislature acts on
this issue they would adopt the positions of other Western States
and legislatively establish the limit for probation as being the
same as the limit for incarceration.

Whether or not that happens,

however, is immaterial to this appeal.

The f^ct is, a legislative

void exists which must be filled by this Courtt
CONCLUSION
Respondent has failed to cite a single authority which
refutes appellant's position that where no maximum period for
probation is fixed by the legislature, the maximum should be the
same as the limit for incarceration.

Subsequent legislative action

pursuant to the numerous court decisions which stand for that
proposition, have in no way affected the proposition even though
that respective legislature may have chosen to make the maximums
different.

There seems to be no conflict among the authorities that
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such a maximum period for probation is a necessity to our precepts
of Due Process of Law.

In our sister state Idaho, whose statute

was almost exactly the same as ours, the Idaho Supreme Court
established the position taken by appellant.
Association Standards

The American Bar

support the necessity for such a maximum

and virtually every court which has moved to establish a maximum
where a legislative void existed has used the maximum period of
incarceration as the standard.

Appellant strongly urges this Court

to follow the great weight of authority and established logic and
adopt the same standard.
DATED this ^ O d a y of September, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,

LARRY
Attorn^ for Appellant
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